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ABSTRACT
Pandemic influenza, typically caused by the reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses, can result in severe or
fatal infections in humans. Timely identification of potential pandemic viruses must be a priority in influenza virus
surveillance. However, the range of host species responsible for the generation of novel pandemic influenza viruses
remains unclear. In this study, we conducted serological surveys for avian and human influenza virus infections in
farmed mink and determined the susceptibility of mink to prevailing avian and human virus subtypes. The results
showed that farmed mink were commonly infected with human (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm) and avian (H7N9, H5N6, and
H9N2) influenza A viruses. Correlational analysis indicated that transmission of human influenza viruses occurred
from humans to mink, and that feed source was a probable route of avian influenza virus transmission to farmed
mink. Animal experiments showed that mink were susceptible and permissive to circulating avian and human
influenza viruses, and that human influenza viruses (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm), but not avian viruses, were capable of
aerosol transmission among mink. These results indicate that farmed mink could be highly permissive “mixing
vessels” for the reassortment of circulating human and avian influenza viruses. Therefore, to reduce the risk of
emergence of novel pandemic viruses, feeding mink with raw poultry by-products should not be permitted, and
epidemiological surveillance of influenza viruses in mink farms should be urgently implemented.
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Introduction
Influenza A virus epidemics occur regularly worldwide
and are estimated to cause 3–5 million cases of severe
illness, with 290,000–650,000 deaths each year [1]. Per-
iodic pandemics can be much worse in terms of scale,
morbidity and mortality. Historical pandemic influenza
viruses, such as the 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2, and 2009
H1N1/pdm virus, were all derived from novel reassor-
tant viruses [2,3]. Host species that are susceptible to
both human and animal influenza viruses could, there-
fore, serve as “mixing vessels,” as has been described for
pigs [4], through co-infections to generate novel reas-
sortant viruses with the potential to cause pandemics.
Mink, a fur-bearing animal, and the related ferret are
members of the family Mustelidae. The ferret has
been widely accepted as an excellent animal model for
understanding the virulence and transmission of
influenza viruses as it shares similar lung physiology
and sialic acid (SA) receptor distribution to humans
[5,6]. Similar to ferrets, the SA receptors SA-α-2,3-Gal
and SA-α-2,6-Gal are both found in the respiratory
tracts of mink [7]. Since 1984, several influenza A
virus subtypes, such as avian influenza viruses (AIVs)
H10N4, H5N1, and H9N2, and human influenza
viruses H3N2 and H1N1/pdm [7–11], have been iso-
lated from mink, indicating that the host species
could serve as an intermediate influenza virus host in
transmission between poultry and humans. However,
due to a lack of systematic surveillance of influenza
viruses circulating in mink, their contribution to
influenza virus evolution and susceptibility to prevail-
ing avian and human influenza viruses are unknown.
In recent years, mink farming in China has grown
rapidly, with a corresponding increase in the use of
animal feed, which primarily comprises raw poultry
by-products. Influenza epidemiology data have
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indicated that there are three major subtypes of
influenza viruses prevalent in poultry populations in
China: H5N6, H7N9, and H9N2 [12–14]; in human
populations, the predominant subtypes are H1N1/
pdm and H3N2 [15]. Thus, there may be a possibility
that farmed mink are regularly exposed to human and
avian influenza viruses. As mink in China are not vac-
cinated against influenza viruses, it is relatively
straightforward to perform sero-surveillance for
influenza virus infections in this species. In this
study, we conducted serological surveys for avian
and human influenza virus infections in farmed
mink and determined the susceptibility of mink to




All animal experiments were approved by the Beijing
Association for Science and Technology (approval
SYXK [Beijing] 2007-0023) and conducted in accord-
ance with the Beijing Laboratory Animal Welfare and
Ethics guidelines, as issued by the Beijing Adminis-
tration Committee of Laboratory Animals, and in
accordance with the China Agricultural University
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee guide-
lines (SKLAB-B-2010-003).
Mink blood sampling and influenza virus
antibody detection
Blood samples of mink were collected at slaughter,
mostly from February to March and August to Octo-
ber according to animal slaughter plans. From Sep-
tember 2016 to March 2019, a total of 2455 blood
samples were collected from 34 mink farms in north-
ern China, of which 1772 were located in Shandong
province (which produces more than 50% of the
mink in China), and 683 were from Hebei province.
For each group of 500–3000 mink, blood samples
were collected on the same day from 20–150 mink
(a 5% sample). This provided a 95% confidence
level, that is, if the minimum prevalence of seroposi-
tive mink was 10%, at least one seropositive mink
would be identified. Detailed production information
was collected from each group tested which included
age, feed type, location, and group size. Haemaggluti-
nation inhibition (HI) assays were performed as pre-
viously described [16]. Based on the World Health
Organization (WHO) guideline for vaccine evalu-
ation, HI antibody titres of ≥40 would be considered
positive. Virus neutralization (VN) assay was used to
confirm positive HI results. VN antibody titres of
≥10 were considered positive. Mink sera were con-
sidered seropositive only if they were both HI- and
VN-positive (HI+/VN+). From 2016 to 2019, H1N1/
pdm and H3N2 influenza viruses were prevalent in
human populations in northern China [15]. The
AIV subtypes H5N6, H7N9, and H9N2 are endemic
in domestic poultry [12,13]. Thus, human H1N1/
pdm and H3N2 viruses, and avian H5N6, H7N9,
and H9N2 viruses were chosen as diagnostic antigens
for the HI and VN assays. Taking into consideration
antigenic drift of influenza viruses over time, A/
Hebei/1104/2016 (H1N1/pdm), A/Beijing/1230/2016
(H3N2), A/duck/Eastern China/S0711/2014 (H5N6),
A/chicken/Henan/KF/2014 (H7N9), and A/chicken/
Shandong/1/2016 (H9N2) viruses were used to detect
seroconversion in samples from 2016 to 2017; A/Beij-
ing/0212/2018 (H1N1/pdm), A/Tianjin/0122/2018
(H3N2), A/chicken/Northern China/F0130c/2018
(H5N6), A/chicken/Hebei/0417/2018 (H7N9), and
A/chicken/Shandong/0322/2018 (H9N2) were used
on sera from 2018 to 2019.
Mink influenza virus infection and transmission
Four-month-old female mink, weighing 1000–1200 g,
were purchased from a farm in Yantai, Shandong pro-
vince. All were seronegative for currently circulating
influenza viruses (H1, H3, H5, H7, and H9). Three
mink in each group were anaesthetized with ketamine
(20 mg/kg) and xylazine (1 mg/kg), and inoculated
intranasally with 106 50% tissue culture infective
dose (TCID50) of test virus in a 1 mL volume
(500 μL per nostril). The animals were subsequently
euthanised at 4 days post-infection (dpi), and nasal
turbinate, trachea, lung, liver, kidney, spleen, intestine,
and brain samples were collected for virus titration in
Madin–Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells. Nasal tur-
binate, trachea, and lung tissues were also used for his-
topathological analysis and immuno-detection of viral
nucleoprotein. In virus transmission, groups of three
mink were anaesthetized and inoculated intranasally
with 106 TCID 50 of virus. The following day, a respir-
atory-droplet contact mink was housed in a wire
frame cage 5 cm from the infected donor mink. To
monitor virus shedding, nasal washes were collected
from all animals every other day for 12 days and
titrated for virus in MDCK cells. Sera were collected
from both the inoculated and contact animals at
14 dpi. Seroconversion was analysed using HI assays.
Clinical signs, temperature and body weight were
recorded daily for all animals. A/Beijing/0212/2018
(H1N1/pdm), A/Tianjin/0122/2018 (H3N2), A/
mink/Northern China/F0130 m/2018 (H5N6, a highly
pathogenic AIV [HPAIV]), A/chicken/Hebei/0417/
2018 (H7N9, a low pathogenicity avian influenza
virus [LPAIV]), and A/chicken/Shandong/0322/2018
(H9N2) viruses were used for mink infection. All
experiments with H5 and H7 subtype viruses were
performed in biosafety level 3 containments.
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Statistical analyses
The relationship between seroprevalence of human
influenza viruses in mink and human infection cases
was evaluated using Spearman rank correlation coeffi-
cient (rho, ρ). The degree of correlation was con-
sidered weak if ρ was <0.4, moderate if ρ was ≥0.4
and <0.6, and strong if ρ was ≥0.6. Human case data
were obtained from the weekly influenza surveillance
reports of the Chinese Centre for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) from 2016 to 2019 [15]. Pear-
son’s chi-squared test or Fisher’s exact test was used to
assess significant differences in seroprevalence
between the groups with different feed types. For all
analyses, a P-value of <.05 was considered to be stat-
istically significant. All analyses were performed
using SPSS software version 19.0 (IBM Corporation,
Armonk, NY, USA).
Results
Seroprevalence of antibodies against influenza
viruses in farmed mink
The overall seroprevalence of human and avian
influenza viruses in the collected mink samples was
76.8% (1,885/2,455 [positive for both HI and VN
assays, HI+/VN+]), of which 47.3% (1,162/2,455)
and 11.4% (279/2,455) were positive for H1N1/
pdm and H3N2 influenza viruses, respectively; and
2.8% (68/2,455), 3.9% (96/2,455), and 39.7% (975/
2,455) were positive for avian viruses H5N6,
H7N9, and H9N2, respectively (Figure 1(A) and
Figure 2).
Further analysis of co-infection prevalence in the
1885 HI+/VN+ samples showed that 34.7% (655/
1885) of the samples were seropositive for multiple
influenza virus subtypes, of which 32.3% (608/1885)
contained both avian and human influenza anti-
bodies (Figure 1(B) and Supplementary Figure 1).
Specifically, the seroprevalence in mink for avian
H9N2 and human H1N1/pdm viruses was 26.2%
(494/1885), seroprevalence for avian H5N6 and
human influenza viruses was 0.8% (15/1885), and
seroprevalence for avian H7N9 and human
influenza viruses was 1.2% (23/1885) (Supplementary
Table 1).
Association between incidence of human
influenza virus infection in humans and
corresponding seroprevalence in farmed mink
Analysis of monthly seroprevalence data for all
viruses found that the seroprevalence of human
influenza virus in mink correlated with circulating
virus levels in humans; it was high from February
to March and relatively low from August to October
(Supplementary Table 2). We further analysed the
correlations of the incidence of human influenza
virus infections between mink and human popu-
lations. Cumulative human cases of H1N1/pdm
virus infections had increased annually from 2016
(Figure 3(A)). Seroprevalence of H1N1/pdm virus
in mink followed the same rising trend, peaking at
72.0% in 2019 (Figure 3(A)), and was positively cor-
related with the incidence of human infection (P
= .005, ρ = .746) (Table 1). Human cases of human
H3N2 virus infections peaked in 2017 followed by
subsequent decline. Similarly, the seroprevalence of
H3N2 virus in mink was at its highest in 2017 (at
20.2%), which was followed by decline. There was
no significant correlation between the seroprevalence
of H3N2 virus antibodies in mink and incidence of
H3N2 virus infections in humans (Table 1). However,
given that influenza seroconversion in mink would
lag behind those in human populations, and if this
lag period of one or two months is taken into
account, the correlation between the two host popu-
lations for H3N2 virus infection was statistically sig-
nificant (Table 1).
Figure 1. Seroprevalence of influenza viruses in farmed mink in northern China. (A) Seroprevalence of influenza viruses in mink by
combined HI and VN assays. A total of 2455 serum samples were assayed by HI (titres of ≥40 were considered positive). All HI
positive samples were confirmed by VN assays (titres of ≥10 were considered positive). (B) Breakdown of positive samples by
virus subtypes. Details of the number of positive samples are shown in Table S1. Note: HI: haemagglutination inhibition; VN:
virus neutralization.
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Association between feed type and avian
influenza virus infection in farmed mink
Previous research found that influenza virus could be
transmitted from swine to mink following feeding ani-
mals with a ration composed of uncooked meat by-
products of swine [11]. Here, we examined whether
feed was a possible route for AIV transmission to
farmed mink. Mink are usually fed with raw poultry
by-products (offal and carcasses of poultry) from two
months old. For better reproduction performance,
some mink farms use fish products supplemented
with 20–30% poultry by-products. The majority of
farms investigated (24/34) used only poultry by-pro-
ducts, and the remaining 10 farms used both poultry
by-products and fish (mixed-feed farms) (Supplemen-
tary Table 3). In farms that used only poultry by-pro-
ducts, the seroprevalence values of avian H5N6, H7N9,
andH9N2 viruses were 3.7%, 5.2%, and 45.4%, respect-
ively. These were significantly higher (P < .001) than
the seroprevalence values in the mixed-feed farms,
which were 0.2%, 0.3%, and 23.7% for H5N6, H7N9,
and H9N2 viruses, respectively (Figure 3(B)).
Susceptibility of mink to circulating avian and
human influenza viruses
To determine host susceptibility, mink were intrana-
sally infected with human (H1N1/pdm and H3N2)
Figure 2. Antibody titres in serum samples from farmed mink that were positive for influenza viruses. (A) HI titres in samples
positive for human H1N1/pdm and H3N2 viruses, or avian H5N6, H7N9 and H9N2 viruses from a total of 2455 samples (titres
of ≥40 were considered positive). (B) VN titres in samples positive for human H1N1/pdm and H3N2 viruses, or avian H5N6,
H7N9, or H9N2 viruses from a total of 2108 HI-positive samples (titres of ≥10 were considered positive). The number of positive
serum samples for each virus is indicated.
Figure 3. Correlational analysis of mink infection with human and avian influenza viruses. (A) Statistical analysis of the number of
human seasonal influenza A (H1N1/pdm andH3N2) cases and the seroprevalence of influenza virus infection in farmedmink in north-
ernChina from2016 to 2019. Coloured columns indicateweekly number of human cases of influenza virus infection from the influenza
surveillance reports of China CDC from 2016 to 2019. Dashed lines show the seroprevalence of H1N1/pdm and H3N2 viruses in differ-
ent mink farms. (B) Comparison of the seroprevalence values according to the types of food used to feed mink in farms. ***P < .001,
between farms feeding mink with poultry by-products only and those feeding mink with both poultry by-products and fish.
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and avian (H5N6, H7N9, and H9N2) influenza
viruses. Clinically, mink infected with human
H3N2 virus were asymptomatic, while those infected
with H1N1/pdm, H7N9, and H9N2 influenza viruses
exhibited transient signs of pyrexia (Supplementary
Figure 2(A)), sneezing and nasal discharge. H5N6
virus was the most pathogenic, and infected mink
displayed severe pyrexia and weight loss (>15%),
which led to the euthanasia of all three mink at
10 dpi (Supplementary Figure 2(B)). No apparent
abnormality was found in the lungs of mink with
H3N2 virus infection; however, multifocal areas of
pulmonary consolidation were present in the lungs
of mink infected with H1N1/pdm, H7N9, and
H9N2 viruses (Figure 4). Consistent with the clinical
severity, H5N6 virus infections caused the most
severe gross and histopathological changes in the
lungs (Figure 4). Virus shedding up to 6 dpi was evi-
dent from infected mink for all avian and human
influenza viruses, with a virus titre range of 103.5–
105.5 TCID50/mL based on nasal washes. With
avian H5N6 and H9N2 viruses, shedding continued
to be detected at 8 dpi (Supplementary Table 4).
Virus spread to other tissues was consistent with
the severity of infection. Human H3N2 virus was
detected only in the nasal turbinate, whereas
H1N1/pdm, H7N9, and H9N2 viruses were detected
throughout the respiratory tract (Figures 5 and 6).
The systemic spread of the H5N6 virus was evident
by its presence in all organs examined (Figures 5
and 6).
Table 1. Correlations of seroprevalence of human influenza
viruses between mink and human populations.
Number of months lagged
H1N1/pdm H3N2
rhoa P valuea rho P value
0 0.746 .005 0.445 .147
1 0.739 .006 0.616 .033
2 0.789 .002 0.674 .016
Note: Statistically significant differences (P < .05) in italics.
aSpearman correlation test.
Figure 4. Gross pathology and histopathology of the lungs of mink infected with human (H1N1/pdm and H3N2) and avian (H5N6,
H7N9, and H9N2) influenza viruses at 4 dpi. Lungs of mink with H1N1/pdm, H9N2, and H7N9 influenza virus infections showed
mild to moderate pulmonary consolidation with varying degrees of bronchitis. Few remarkable pathological findings were
obtained from the lungs of mink infected with the H3N2 virus. In contrast, the H5N6 influenza virus caused severe lesions
with extensive pulmonary consolidation, peribronchiolitis and bronchopneumonia characterised by oedema and infiltration of
inflammatory cells. Images shown are representative of three mink from three independent experiments.
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Transmission of human influenza viruses
among mink
To assess airborne transmissibility of human and avian
influenza A viruses among mink, naïve mink were
placed 5 cm away, in groups of three in separate wire
cages, from infected mink 24 h post-infection. Human
H1N1/pdm and H3N2 viruses were readily transmitted
from mink that were infected earlier, via aerosol, to
naïvemink at 2 and 4 dpi, respectively, with subsequent
seroconversion (Figure 7 and Supplementary Table 5).
No airborne transmission to naïve mink was detected
with avian H5N6, H7N9, and H9N2 viruses (Figure 7
and Supplementary Table 5).
Discussion
We found that farmed mink in China were commonly
infected with avian and human influenza viruses, of
which human H1N1/pdm and avian H9N2 influenza
virus infections were the most prevalent. The high ser-
oprevalence of combined avian and human influenza
viruses suggests a strong likelihood of co-infections
Figure 5. Virus replication in mink infected with avian and human influenza viruses. Mink were inoculated intranasally with 106
TCID50 of indicated viruses. Three mink per group were euthanised at 4 dpi, and samples of nasal turbinate, trachea, lung, spleen,
liver, kidney, intestine and cerebrum were collected from each mink for virus titration by TCID50 assays on MDCK cells. Systemic
spread of H5N6 virus was detected in all organs examined. All values shown are means ± SD from three independent experiments
for each sample. Dashed lines indicate the lower limits of detection.
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and thus farmed mink could serve as “mixing vessels,”
as in pigs, for the generation of novel reassortant
viruses. Our host susceptibility analysis found that
mink are susceptible and permissive to circulating
avian (H7N9, H5N6, and H9N2) and human (H3N2
and H1N1/pdm) influenza A viruses. Only the
human influenza viruses, not avian viruses, were
capable of aerosol transmission among mink,
suggesting that mink are similar to ferrets as condu-
cive hosts for human influenza virus replication. We
previously found that the avian H9N2 virus subtype
shows good gene compatibility in reassortment with
the human H1N1/pdm virus, which in co-infection
could generate novel reassortant viruses with high
human infectivity [17]. Although the co-infection
rates of avian H5 or H7 viruses with human H1N1/
pdm or H3N2 viruses appear low, the public health
threat from such reassortant viruses should not be
ignored as their pandemic potential has been exper-
imentally demonstrated [18–21].
Infection prevalence of human H1N1/pdm or
H3N2 viruses in both human and mink populations
strongly indicates human-to-mink virus transmission.
Previous studies suggested that mammalian and avian
influenza viruses could be effectively transmitted to
mink through uncooked poultry or pork by-products
[7,10,11,22–24]. Our correlational analysis supports
the notion that feeding mink with raw poultry by-pro-
ducts is a major source of AIV transmission. Avian
H9N2 influenza virus is the most dominant subtype
in poultry [13,25] and was also the most common ser-
opositive subtype found in farmed mink. Notably,
Figure 6. Detection of viral nucleoprotein in the respiratory tract of mink infected with influenza viruses at 4 dpi. Tissue sections of
nasal turbinate, trachea and lung (alveoli) were immunostained for viral nucleoprotein (red-brown staining). Extensive distribution
of H1N1/pdm, H5N6, H7N9, and H9N2 influenza virus were evident in the nasal turbinate, trachea, and lung. In contrast, the H3N2
virus was mainly restricted to the nasal turbinate.
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since the introduction of the avian H7N9 subtype vac-
cine to chicken flocks in China in 2017 [26], no H7N9
seropositive mink was detected in 2019.
Recently, the rapid spread of the severe acute res-
piratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)
infection was reported in mink farms in several
countries in Europe and the Americas; millions of
mink were culled to control the spread of the virus
[27–29]. As mink are inherently susceptible to both
influenza viruses and SARS-CoV-2, it is important
to prevent mink from being infected with such viruses.
Clear intervention steps that should be taken are to
stop the use of raw poultry products in the prevention
of influenza virus transmission to mink and to isolate
all workers with respiratory symptoms from mink
farms. In summary, mink as a host species is highly
susceptible and permissive to circulating human and
avian influenza viruses. To avoid serious public health
threats from the emergence of highly pathogenic virus
reassortants, basic preventative husbandry steps, such
Figure 7. Aerosol transmission of human influenza viruses between mink. Groups of three mink were inoculated intranasally with
106 TCID50 of the viruses indicated. The following day, a respiratory-droplet contact mink was housed in a wire frame cage 5 cm
from infected donor mink cage. Nasal washes for virus shedding detection were collected every two days from all animals. Virus
titres were determined by TCID50 assays on MDCK cells. Each coloured bar represents the virus titre in a single animal. Horizontal
dashed lines indicate the lower limits of virus detection.
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as a ban on the use of raw poultry feed, along with
regular virus surveillance of mink farms should be
urgently implemented.
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